The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1993/93_1783/93_1783.zs

Text File | 1995-03-21 | 3.8 KB | 73 lines

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING & DRY
DOCK CO. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 93-1783.   Argued January 9, 1995-Decided March 21, 1995

The Director of the Labor Department's Office of Workers' Compensa-
 tion Programs petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of a
 Benefits Review Board decision that, inter alia, denied Jackie
 Harcum full-disability compensation under the Longshore and
 Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).  Harcum did not seek
 review and, while not opposing the Director's pursuit of the action,
 expressly declined to intervene on his own behalf in response to an
 inquiry by the court.  Acting sua sponte, the court concluded that
 the Director lacked standing to appeal the benefits denial because
 she was not ``adversely affected or aggrieved'' thereby within the
 meaning of 21(c) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. 921(c).
Held:  The Director is not ``adversely affected or aggrieved'' under
 921(c).  Pp. 3-14.
  (a)  Section 921(c) does not apply to an agency acting as a regula-
tor or administrator under the statute.  This is strongly suggested
by the fact that, despite long use of the phrase ``adversely affected
or aggrieved'' as a term of art to designate those who have standing
to appeal a federal agency decision, no case has held that an agen-
cy, without benefit of specific authorization to appeal, falls within
that designation; by the fact that the United States Code's general
judicial review provision, 5 U. S. C. 551(2), which employs the
phrase ``adversely affected or aggrieved,'' specifically excludes agen-
cies from the category of persons covered; and by the clear evidence
in the Code that when an agency in its governmental capacity is
meant to have standing, Congress says so, see, e.g., 29 U. S. C.
660(a) and (b).  While the text of a particular statute could make
clear that ``adversely affected or aggrieved'' is being used in a
peculiar sense, the Director points to no such text in the LHWCA.
Pp. 3-9.
  (b)  Neither of the categories of interest asserted by the Director
demonstrates that ``adversely affected or aggrieved'' in this statute
must have an extraordinary meaning.  The Director's interest in
ensuring adequate payments to claimants is insufficient.  Agencies
do not automatically have standing to sue for actions that frustrate
the purposes of their statutes; absent some clear and distinctive
responsibility conferred upon the agency, an ``adversely affected or
aggrieved'' judicial review provision leaves private interests (even
those favored by public policy) to be vindicated by private parties.
Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413; Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U. S. 463;
Pasadena City Bd. of Ed. v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424; and General
Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318, distinguished.
Also insufficient is the Director's asserted interest in fulfilling
important administrative and enforcement responsibilities.  She fails
to identify any specific statutory duties that an erroneous Board
ruling interferes with, reciting instead conjectural harms to abstract
and remote concerns.  Pp. 9-14.
8 F. 3d 175, affirmed.
 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and
Breyer, JJ., joined.  Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment.